Since Russia invaded Ukraine one month ago, Western countries have shown an unprecedented level of coordination to design sanctions packages restricting Russian access to foreign reserves, trade, transportation, sports and targeting the interests of oligarchs supporting Putin’s regime (Valerio Bruno). As Kara Tan Bhala notes, “it seemed unthinkable just a few weeks ago that the West and its allies would ban select Russian banks from SWIFT”. This signals the determination of the international community, despite divergence between Asian, African and South American countries (Etienne Perrot).
However, several factors tend to limit the effectiveness of sanctions. First, Domingo Sugranyes explains, “sanctions have been imposed within limits due to dependence on Russian oil and gas”. This is particularly the case in Europe where for instance Germany receives more than 50% of their gas from Russia, notes Christine Schliesser. Second, China may discreetly contribute to soften the blow for Russia, for instance through resource deals and lending from state-owned banks. Finally, to some extent, the Russian economy will be able to adjust with domestic industry substituting foreign firms and trade.
As a result of this complexity, opinions diverge on what should be done in the present situation. Yuriy Temirov, university professor in Ukraine, argues that sanctions should first stop the aggression and second isolate Russia, “minimizing its destructive influence on world politics”. According to Kara Tan Bhala, “the most extreme of economic sanctions would be justified”, including “a complete two-way trade embargo on Russian merchandise, services, foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio management.” In contrast, Edouard Dommen argues, “sanctions fail to achieve the foreign policy objectives of the powers applying them and meanwhile they inflict hardship (including increased mortality) especially on the powerless in the countries targeted.”
Current sanctions may be insufficient to change Russia’s foreign policy goal or prevent a Russian victory in Ukraine, but they are not vain. They may be our best policy response to contain Russian expansionism in the future while avoiding another great-power conflict in Europe, even if some disagree and propose a different approach (Cornford). Indirectly, sanctions may crystallize a wake-up call for the European Union and higher energy prices (as a result of sanctions) may drive innovation in renewable energy (Schliesser).

To talk of the „international community“ is optimistic. At the UN, China has recognised the „legitimacy“ of the Russian position. Asian – apart from Japan – African and South American countries are divided. And even if Germany has given in to the European majority, it is to be feared that it will cause some cracks in the device. In addition to financial sanctions and the interruption of major transaction channels, the supreme economic weapon remains the blockade, which is more rigorous than the embargo (decided by states) and the boycott (initiated by civil society). The effects of the blockade will be the asphyxiation of the Russian economy and its people with as a result the tightening of economic and strategic ties between Russia and China, and in the West, the accentuation of inflation, which will mainly affect the most fragile populations.

Etienne Perrot
Jesuit, Dr. Economics sciences, editorial board of the magazine Choisir (Geneva), editorial adviser of the journal Études (Paris)

It is difficult to think serenely while the horror of aggression goes on and common people are being punished just because they longed for a better life. Sanctions have been imposed within limits due to dependence on Russian oil and gas. For those who still think that a “peace and trade” model is better than a world fractured in closed economic zones, when armed conflict stops – hopefully soon – there will be an opportunity for the West to disarm economic sanctions (e.g. frozen foreign exchange reserves) in a way which avoids humiliating the adversary and helps to construct peace. But this scenario is still a vague future possibility, unfortunately. For now, the priority is how to make sanctions more effective.

Domingo Sugranyes
Director of a seminar on ethics and technology at Pablo VI Foundation, past Executive Vice-Chairman of MAPFRE international insurance group

Rapid and consequential economic sanctions occur on a daily basis subsequent to the horrific Russian invasion of Ukraine. It seemed unthinkable just a few weeks ago that the West and its allies would ban select Russian banks from SWIFT, an act considered to be a “nuclear option”. Given the devastation, brutality and lack of just cause of the invasion, a proportionate reaction from Ukraine’s allies would be justified under just war theory. Indeed, while Russian soldiers inflict death and destruction, economic sanctions do not directly result in these outcomes. As such, the most extreme of economic sanctions would be justified. Such actions can include a complete two-way trade embargo on Russian merchandise, services, foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio management.

Kara Tan Bhala
President and Founder of Seven Pillars Institute for Global Finance and Ethics

Sanctions are a tool of power politics particularly popular with the United States but also used by other countries and regional groupings. In the 1980s the hope was that at last a clean, non-violent alternative to war had been found. Sanctions have been studied by several scholars over the years. Their conclusion is overwhelmingly that they fail to achieve the foreign policy objectives of the powers applying them and that meanwhile they inflict hardship (including increased mortality) especially on the powerless in the countries targeted. Those who are anxious to find peaceful ways of settling international conflicts need to keep thinking !

Edouard Dommen
Specialist in economic ethics, former university professor and researcher in UNCTAD and president of Geneva’s Ecumenical Workshop in Theology

Ukraine is a major global export nation of grain. Some African countries buy 40% of their wheat from Ukraine. World Food Programme fears that the bombs in Ukraine may take the global hunger crisis, fuelled already by COVID, to an unprecedented level. This war needs to stop and it needs to stop quickly. Every day, half a billion Euro go to Russia in payment for Russian oil, gas and coal. This steady stream of money needs to be dried out. Tell Putin that expiring energy contracts will not be renewed. Countries like Germany that receive more than 50% of their gas from Russia can partly compensate this by extending the lifetime of their nuclear power plants. While social hardship must be cushioned, higher prices will also drive innovation in renewable energy. Here, climate- and geopolitics come together.

Christine Schliesser
Senior Lecturer at Zurich University in Systematic Theology and Ethics and Director of studies at Fribourg University’s Center for Faith and Society

The economic sanctions affecting more deeply Russia’s economy are on the one hand the freezing of its Central Bank assets held abroad and on the other hand the withdrawal of multinational corporations from Russia. Interestingly, the latter have followed almost spontaneously the packages produced by a number of governments, including the US, EU countries and the UK in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. If sanctions affecting the inner circle of “oligarchs” close to Putin are important mostly from a symbolic perspective, the public opinion in “western” countries has made extremely high for the private sector the reputational cost of doing business as usual with Russia, risking of being seen as neutral in relation to a bloody and pointless invasion.

Valerio Bruno
Researcher in politics and Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR)

To determine the nature of the sanctions against Russia for its aggression against Ukraine, it is necessary to answer the questions: What is the purpose of the sanctions? Within the framework of what policy towards Russia are they carried out? Under the current conditions, sanctions should consist of two related groups. The first group of sanctions should stop the aggression as soon as possible and punish the aggressor. The second group of sanctions should be carried out within the framework of the strategy of isolating Russia, minimizing its destructive influence on world politics. The need for isolation is due to the impossibility of a democratic transformation of the Russian Federation in the short term.

Yuriy Temirov
Assoc. prof., Dean of Faculty of History and International Relations, Vasyl Stus Donetsk National University

The differences and hesitations are in many cases fundamental. As indicated in the General Assembly vote, many developing countries are unwilling to associate themselves with the condemnation of Russia. Questions have been raised even in the North as to the likely effects and opportunities for workarounds of measures designed to target financial institutions such as access to SWIFT. Moreover the effects of sanctions – for example on supply chains – are at best only partly understood. Blowback from Russia, for example for important primary commodities, is inevitable. It is plausibly argued that commitments made to Russia concerning NATO during the 1990s have not been observed by the major Western countries. Therefore, the question could be reoriented away from strengthening sanctions to rethinking the current initiatives which are likely to increase military expenditure and to contradict international action regarding climate change.

Andrew Cornford
Counsellor, Observatoire de la Finance; past staff member of UNCTAD, with special responsibility for financial regulation and international trade in financial services